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Like non-human animal signals,
human facial displays are an important
way that we regulate our social inter-
actions, whether they are in public or in
private, and whether our ‘interactants’
are real or fantasied people, non-
human animals, virtual agents, or even
inanimate objects toward which we
attribute agency.
Facial displays are not fixed, semantic
read-outs of internal states such as
emotions or intentions, but flexibleBased on modern theories of signal evolution and animal communication, the
behavioral ecology view of facial displays (BECV) reconceives our ‘facial
expressions of emotion’ as social tools that serve as lead signs to contingent
action in social negotiation. BECV offers an externalist, functionalist view of
facial displays that is not bound to Western conceptions about either expres-
sions or emotions. It easily accommodates recent findings of diversity in facial
displays, their public context-dependency, and the curious but common occur-
rence of solitary facial behavior. Finally, BECV restores continuity of human
facial behavior research with modern functional accounts of non-human com-
munication, and provides a non-mentalistic account of facial displays well-
suited to new developments in artificial intelligence and social robotics.tools for social influence. Facial dis-
plays are not about us, but about
changing the behavior of those around
us.
The behavioral ecology view of facial
displays (BECV) is an externalist and
functionalist approach to facial beha-
vior that reconceives it as signaling
contingent social action.
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(A.J. Fridlund).Facial Displays and Emotions
The field of human facial expressions is riven by two contrasting views of what our expressions
mean and how to study them. The traditional view (the origins of which trace back to at least the
Hellenic age) is that each of a small number of categorical ‘passions’ are universally conveyed
by matching a facial expression; thus, ‘fear’ is expressed by a ‘fear face,’ ‘anger’ by an ‘anger
face,’ and so on. This historical account, known as basic emotions theory (BET), holds that
internal essences (‘emotions’) are externalized via our different facial expressions. Conse-
quently, for BET the face is the ‘royal road to the emotions’ [1–3].
Problems with this longstanding view led to a newer alternative, the behavioral ecology view of
facial displays (BECV) [4,5]. This perspective, rooted in animal communication (see Glossary)
and modern evolutionary biology, suggests that our facial expressions, like many non-human
displays, are not ‘expressions’ of anything. They have no intrinsic meaning tied to their
morphologies, nor are they contingent upon any specific internal state [6]. Within BECV,
our faces are ‘social tools’ that, like many animal displays, are used as lead signs of contingent
action in social negotiation, and how they function depends upon the context of the current
social interaction, the interactants, and their interaction histories.
In the present paper, we note the limitations of approaches that conceive of facial displays as
outward expressions of internal emotions. Then, we outline an alternative that is functional,
externalist, and fundamentally social: the BECV. Finally, we show how the perspective of BECV
has been advantageous for grappling with the complexity of our facial displays, forging stronger
links between these and non-human displays, and developing useful modes of simulating them
in embodied computerized agents and other forms of artificial intelligence (AI).
An Essentialist View of Faces and Emotions
The roots of BET are distinctly Western, with early approaches by Aristotle, but they owe
especially to Descartes’s continuation of the Hellenic view of emotion as set against reason [7].
Descartes’s ‘passions’ were categorical entities that perturbed the ‘animal spirits’ in the
corporeal body, and could become sufficiently intense to compromise rationality and fomentTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.02.006 1
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Glossary
Active appearance model: a
computer vision approach in which a
set of model parameters (e.g., from a
prototype image) is tuned to achieve
a statistical best fit to a new image.
Adaptive radiation: the evolutionary
diversification of a single lineage into
a series of forms adapted to different
niches (e.g., Darwin’s observations of
variation among the finches across
the Galápagos).
Communication: the reduction of
uncertainty for receivers provided by
prognostic movements of signalers
[4]. The prognostic value of these
movements is typically probabilistic;
see ‘ecology of signaling’.
Cultural evolution: changes in
societal practices due to cultural
variation, selection, and inheritance,
analogous to the biological
processes operative in evolution by
natural selection [37,39].
Ecology of signaling: a
coevolutionary process whereby
receivers discern lead signs to
others’ behavior, and the producers
of those lead signs learn to deploy
them to influence receivers. This
signaling ecology is probabilistic.
Displayers may emit bluffs and false
alarms, and because so-called
‘honest’ displays are readily
mimicked, receivers develop
necessary skepticism. Essentialist,
moral concepts like ‘honesty’ or
‘authenticity’ are actually indices of
signal reliability, good matches of
lead signs to behaviors, with receiver
judgments constituted of moving
averages of reliability estimates
derived from past interaction histories
and current interaction contexts.
Epigenetic marking: changes
(‘marks’) to genes that silence or
activate certain gene sequences but
do not change the genes
themselves. These changes occur
within the lifespan, are stable and
heritable, and they alter the
‘functional genome’ without changing
the ‘structural genome’.
Essentialism: the doctrine that
every object has properties that
grant it a particular form or
‘essence’. Basic emotion theory is
essentialist in declaring that there are
separable, numerable emotions with
intrinsic qualities that define each.incivility. The passions were first tied to the face by artist Charles LeBrun, who prescribed the
anatomically correct and appropriately nuanced facial configuration for each Cartesian passion
[8]. These links became lore, passed down and eventually incorporated into personality theorist
Silvan Tomkins’s sprawling, quasi-cybernetic affect theory, which, mutatis mutandis, became
the most popular and researched BET variant: Ekman’s neurocultural theory [1].
BET is considered canonical in much of cognitive science, due in part to its origin as received
wisdom from Descartes and LeBrun. A recent poll of hundreds of prominent emotion research-
ers found that 80% supported the view that certain facial displays are universal ‘expressions of
emotion’ [9]. For instance, the ‘gasping face’ is commonly used in amygdala studies to indicate
fear [10]. The putative, categorical ‘facial expressions of emotions’ have also found convenient
use in many applied areas, such as in AI avatar and social-robotics algorithms [11].
Despite its popularity, the assumptions and prescriptions of BET are meeting unprecedented
challenges. BET and related views are essentialist theories [12]. As we shall see, their
essentialism constrains their ability to incorporate real-world data which fall outside their
prescriptions.
Challenges to the Essentialist View of Faces and Emotions: New Evidence
from Small-Scale, Indigenous Societies
The historical BET approach to facial expressions can be illustrated by an example from an
indigenous, small-scale society. The Trobrianders of Papua New Guinea are subsistence
horticulturalists and fishermen for whom the involvement of magic is pervasive in nearly all
aspects of daily life [13]. Trobrianders believe that supernatural beings such as ghosts, evil
spirits, or flying witches exert influence over them and can even cause misery and death [14].
These spirits can emerge from the bushes at night, perch atop yam houses, or hide within the
studs of a house. Notably, those studs are called kokola, which means ‘fear’ in the Tro-
brianders’ language [15]. Thus, a Trobriand intruder intent on harming others or stealing their
yams could be rejected by concealment magic (kaigau) or by the magic of the mwamwala (a
spirit), either of which can provoke sickness or death (Figure 1).
For BET, the interloper will likely feel fear (kokola) when approaching a yam house and facing the
mwamwala. This fear,once triggered, releases acascadeofneurologically programmedchanges
(the ‘facial affect program’) that includes a prewired, universal ‘expression’ of the instigating
emotion; for fear, it’s thegasping face [1,16]. Iconic designated facial actions like thegasping face
comprise the BET ‘facial expressions of emotions,’ which BET contends are generated and
understood pan-culturally [2]. This assumption about how Trobrianders must react to such
sorcery, by having fear, and therefore expressing a ‘fear face,’ would constitute a piece of
fieldwork consistent with the BET universality thesis. This thesis predicates that, once they
are triggered by environmental elicitors sharing common themes across cultures, then universal,
separable, numerable emotions inside will be expressed in universal, prototypical ways outside.
The tests that lent initial support to this universality thesis were conducted among peoples
similar to the Trobrianders, in small-scale, indigenous societies that were sufficiently isolated to
permit pan-cultural claims. These studies, originally heralded as proving universality, are now in
dispute, because of both serious methodological problems and countervailing data emerging
from new studies [17]. While the impact of the replication movement was beginning to confront
psychology [18], two independent multidisciplinary research labs conducted new tests among
three indigenous peoples, one Melanesian (the Trobrianders of Papua New Guinea) and two
African (the Himba of Namibia and the Mwani of Mozambique) [19–22] (Box 1). The data2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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Founder effect: a very few atypical
‘founders’ establish an offshoot
population.
Genetic drift: the change in
frequency of alleles in a population
due to non-randomness in the seed
population. It is most common in
smaller populations and it can
produce phenotypic diversity even in
neighboring populations. The
extreme of genetic drift is the
founder effect.
Recognition studies: experimental
tasks in which observers commonly
are asked to match one stimulus to
a response option (e.g., facial
displays, emotion labels and
antecedents, valence and arousal,
behavioral repertoire), or to produce
a response freely after being showed
one stimulus.
SNP: a variation in a single DNA
nucleotide (e.g., cytosine replaced by
thymine), occurring roughly once in
every 300 nucleotides. They are the
most common type of genetic
variation in humans, and they allow
genetic identifications of diverse
cultures, and mappings (‘haplotype
maps’) of dominant maternity or
paternity in ethnic and/or geographic
groups.
Universality thesis: the assumption
that certain facial actions (‘facial
expressions of emotion’) convey
categorical, numerable, subpersonal
basic emotions such as happiness,
sadness, anger, fear, or disgust, with
the expression and recognition of





Figure 1.Magic, Evil Spirits, and Fear
in aMelanesian Small-Scale Society.
(A) One mwamwala sits on top of the yam
house (liku) to protect the harvested yams
with its magic. A mwamwala is consid-
ered a spirit (tokwai) (Jarillo de la Torre, S.,
PhD thesis, University of Cambridge,
2013). (B) A tokwai lives in rocks and trees
(e.g., as found in the studs of a Trobriand
house). Tokwai can be used by sorcerers’
magic to protect gardens and houses
from human, animal, and supernatural
intruders [92]. (C) The production of ‘fear’
gasping faces from an essentialist view of
faces and emotions. The spirit inside the
mwamwala triggers fear in thieves
approaching the yam house; the fear, in
turn, results in its expression as the gasp-
ing face. The stipulation that the gasping
face expresses fear does not hold for
these Trobrianders, who regard it as a
threat display.gathered in the past 5 years by the two teams are inconsistent with the universality thesis.
These results were obtained using a variety of methods (e.g., free-labeling, forced-choice,
emotional antecedents, sorting). Moreover, these new studies involved tests of several com-
peting theories and explanatory frameworks (e.g., core affect theory, action-identification
theory, behavioral ecology) [23]. Special attention was also paid to ethnographic issues side-
stepped in the early BET studies but now obligatory for internal and external validity: conducting
prior extensive fieldwork to build a much-needed descriptive base [24,25], speaking the local
languages, and designing and testing the hypotheses based on those in-field findings [26].
The universality thesis was challenged most powerfully by a convergence of experimental tests
using ‘recognition’ studies [23], material culture such as carvings [26], and observational
ethological data [27]. All three sources of evidence controvert the BET prescription for the
‘gasping face.’ Trobrianders understand it not as a ‘fear’ face, but a threat display. First,
recognition studies conducted in the Trobriand Islands showed that this understanding was
commonplace within and across different islands of the archipelago, regardless of the assess-
ment method (e.g., label-facial display matching, story-facial display matching). Second,
carvings depicting Trobriand flying witches (yoyowa) using the gasping face to threaten villagers
extend backmore than a century. Finally, observational data show that the gasping face is used
as a threat display not just among one ‘exotic’ group of people, but also in several African,
Amazonian, and Pacific small-scale, indigenous societies.
Facial Displays as a Flexible System to Negotiate Interactions
The growing evidence on cognitive diversity shows how culture influences basic psychological
phenomena [28–30], and research on facial expressions shows a similar trend. Traditionally,
essentialist emotion theories such as BET conceive facial displays within a system bounded by
Western preconceptions about both ‘emotion’ and ‘expression’ (i.e., interior emotions are
expressed on faces to inform others of those emotions). Deviations from predictions (e.g., when
fear does not produce the predicted gasping face, or when people smile when they say they are
not happy) are considered veneers of inauthenticity [31], reflecting the operation of learnedTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 3
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Box 1. Diversity, Not Uniformity: Evidence from Small-Scale Indigenous Societies
Prior support for the universality thesis restedmostly on using null hypothesis significance testing inmatching-to-sample
experiments, using posed face photos and emotion labels or stories. Although the few tests of the thesis reported overall
matching scores of roughly 50%, the results have been touted consistently as proving universality [17]. Excluding
chance in the way participants responded to the tasks (i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis) became the standard criterion
for claiming universality, regardless of the magnitude of the effect [23]. Ironically, the much higher 90% rate of right-
handedness worldwide, known since Galton’s observations in the 1880’s, never led to a claim of ‘universality of
dexterity.’ Mismatches on those original face studies were always attributed to thin cultural, rule-governed overlays.
Those deviations, like the new evidence found in African andMelanesian populations [19–22], may indicate fundamental
human diversity, just as the approximate 10% global rate of sinistrality and ambidexterity constitutes acknowledged,
stable, congenital variation.
These new studies showed that in many emotion categories considered ‘basic’ (e.g., anger, fear, disgust), respondents
fared poorly by BET expectations. Indigenous respondents attributed disparate meanings to facial displays when
isolated from context. For example, although Western participants clearly believe that a smiling face reflects happiness,
Trobrianders instead associate smiling with behaviors (laughing), Trobriand emotions (mwamwasila; magic of attraction,
radiance), or dimensional affective properties such as valence (kalalumkola bwena, feeling good) [22].
Studies of facial displays and emotions have typically conflated four questions: (i) what accounts for the faces we make
and see? (ii) How do we describe the faces we make and see? (iii) How do we describe the faces that others make? and
(iv) How do people respond to the faces we make and see? Nearly all essentialist theories of facial displays focus on
questions (ii) and (iii). Namely, researchers ascribe face causation to emotions or appraisals (question ii). They typically
present face stimuli (usually photographed poses) to participants, and lead the participants either to generate
ascriptions for them, like emotions, intentions, or goals, or match them to experimenter-provided ascriptions (question
iii). Investigations into questions (ii) and (iii) tend toward self-confirmation, perhaps because the historical BET framework
is part of early childhood education across cultures, via curricula that incorporate classroomwall posters showing arrays
of iconic faces with prescribed emotion labels underneath.
BECV focuses instead on questions (i) and (iv). It posits that the production and behavioral consequences of our facial
displays are intertwined, co-evolved products of both biological and cultural phylogenies, and suggests that they can be
understood only using a functional analysis of social interaction.display rules [2,32]. The concept of display rules is highly problematic on both methodological
and conceptual grounds [5,33,34]. Thus, data that depart from uniformity toward cultural
diversity are explained, ad hoc and post hoc, by recourse to culture-specific learning that
supervenes on the stipulated phylogenetic ‘universal facial expressions of emotion.’ Note,
however, that BET researchers invoke display rules only to explain deviations from uniformity;
never for findings favoring communality. This is a restricted understanding of culture’s range of
influence: cultural diversity may be explained just as well by different subpopulation genetics,
and cultural similarities may owe to convergent cultural evolution.
Nowadays, within the cognitive sciences, the process-uniformity versus content-diversity
dichotomy is considered outdated [35,36]. By contrast, in affective science, the fallacious
twin notions that uniformity implies phylogenesis, whereas diversity implies rule-governance,
are explicit and are generally accepted [1–3]. It is inconsistent with modern theories of natural
and cultural selection to sustain this dichotomy, and flipping the questions indicates the
possibilities. Might phylogeny account for diversity, and ‘culture-specific learning’ for unifor-
mity? [37–39]. True, some expression diversity may result from culture-specific learning, but it
may also arise from biological phenomena like adaptive radiation, founder effects, genetic
drift, random mutation, or epigenetic marking. Indeed, ethnicities differ not only by their
languages and traditions, but also by the SNPs among their genomes [40]. Uniformity may
result from common descent, but also from convergent genetic evolution ensuing after different
initial paths of descent, and, as mentioned earlier, from convergent cultural evolution.
As an example of the latter, the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis (i.e., a proposed link of tickling with
laughter and humor advocated by Charles Darwin and Ewald Hecker) suggests that, in4 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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interaction establishes a context by which physical tickling of the passive infant may be
supplanted first by more elaborate interactive games involving tickling, and then by psycho-
logical ‘tickling’ (i.e., humor) as the child matures and becomes capable of language and
abstraction [41]. Thus, social smiling and laughter, originally elicited reflexively through tickling,
may, in part, arise anew in each society with every generation, with nearly all cultures co-opting
and ‘emancipating’ these responses for later affiliation, play, and humor.
The presumptions of BET, which have not yet incorporated the varied mechanisms at work in
biological and cultural evolution, thereby render the universality thesis and its derived pre-
dictions resistant to falsification. For instance, both high and lowmatching levels on recognition
and production studies can be, and have been, explained ad hoc as well as post hoc by the
baseline assumption of phylogenesis and the selective invocation of cultural display rules for
any unexpected variation [42].
Reliance on these presumptions has had unfortunate effects. First, BET made its foundational
thesis binary (whether or not there is ‘universality’) and stipulated what would explain the
answer. In so doing, it preempted determination of the extent of both display communality and
diversity, and the relative contributions of the many mechanisms that can account for either.
Second, the presumptions of BET have also been too restrictive to allow unbiased inquiry into
how members of different cultures actually use their facial displays. BET foreordained what
certain facial expressions signified, and researchers in the BET tradition searched largely for
agreement with its predictions.
More recent investigations have started from the outset to consider our facial displays as tools
of a flexible, pragmatic system by which humans navigate their social terrain. This flexible
system implies no natural semantic code by which members of all cultures share universal
understandings of certain facial movements. Moreover, a flexible system to regulate interac-
tions should not be circumscribed to the face. Classic functional, microsociological accounts
rightly focused on gestures, postures, proxemics, and proximal context to understand how we
operate within the social world [43,44]. Understanding how our displays function in everyday life
requires a more powerful and open descriptive approach that focuses on situational relevance
rather than iconic meaning, and on the trajectories of the interactants in their social context [45].
Pragmatic [46] and ecological [47] approaches to facial displays have shown how evidence
from other disciplines such as linguistics, environmental psychology, and animal communica-
tion contributes to our appreciation of similarities and differences among diverse human
groups. We next detail such an ecological, functional view of facial displays.
Getting Real about Faces: The Behavioral Ecology View of Facial Displays
The roots of the BECV of facial displays are solidly biological, and stem from modern con-
ceptions of animal signaling (Box 2). BECV is not another expressive theory, and although some
as yet uncertain brain processes certainly intermediate the path from external events to a facial
display, no ‘essence’ or mentalistic state is assumed to be ‘expressed,’ ‘read out,’ or
‘communicated’ by any display. A display may have arisen adventitiously and become ritualized
(dramatized and stereotyped) via natural selection, or similarly ‘conventionalized’ by cultural
selection [48]. Exaptation (co-option) from a related functional response is always a possible
origin (e.g., ear-retraction during alertingmay have been an exaptation for current human brow-
flashing; grimacing may have arisen from the orofacial conformation required to screech or hiss
[5]). Nor does BECV assume display uniformity. It is agnostic on the issue but well-grounded in
contemporary views of the evolutionary and cultural forces at play.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 5
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Box 2. Origins of the Behavioral Ecology View of Facial Displays
By the 1970s, animals were no longer the hapless creatures run by tripwire mechanisms portrayed by early ethologists.
Those same creatures were now recognized as skilled negotiators and context-dependent communicators [4,48]. It
became obvious that animals were signaling more flexibly and contextually than BET theorists were granting for
humans. Indeed, this gap widens further with recent discoveries of exquisitely flexible, contextual signal systems among
non-human primates [6,93–95]. Animal communication was reconceived as an ‘ecology of signaling’ based on the
interests of signal displayers and receivers who have interaction histories andwhomust negotiate for advantage within a
behavioral niche. This insight readily suggested the possibility that human facial displays might be studied similarly, as
part of the growing field of human behavioral ecology, which had traditionally concerned topics such as reproduction
and resource production and distribution [96].
The behavioral ecology view of facial displays (BECV) of facial displays reconciled the growing evidence about animal
signaling with the study of human facial displays and social influence [5,97,98]. BECV provided an open yet parsi-
monious approach to facial displays, without recourse to any intermediating subpersonal constructs (e.g., emotions,
appraisals) in the explanans. To the contrary, the BECV approach was externalist. Facial displays were signals of
contingent social action (i.e., they were lead signs of one’s incipient interaction trajectory), a position that led to
predictions about the functionality of facial displays among interactants, rather than ascriptions of mental causation in
‘expressors’ [49]. Although BECV and BET both emerged fromWestern thought, BECV is more ‘Baconian,’ (i.e., it relies
on induction following observation). By contrast, BET is more ‘Kantian,’ having originally drawn its links of faces to
emotions from received philosophical and aesthetic wisdom. It then made post hoc ergo prompter hoc presumptions
about what innate, categorical facial expressions and perceptions of them evolution and culture must have wrought.Thus, for BECV, facial displays are tools for social influence, and these signals, like all behavior,
are always ramifications of both biological and cultural phylogenies [49], in addition to more
proximal influences such as the identities of the interactants, their interaction history, and the
immediate context of their interaction. Thus, the use of the gasping face as a threat display is
counter-theoretical within BET and escaped previous notice by BET researchers because it
was preordained as expressing ‘fear.’ From the BECV standpoint, its use was readily dis-
cerned, from multiple sources of evidence, as influencing interactants to submit (especially in
agonistic face-to-face interactions), as previously observed not only in the Trobriand Islands but
also in other African, Pacific, and Amazonian small-scale societies [27].
The emphasis in BECV is on what facial behavior does within the interaction. Our facial displays
are not about us, or what is inside us; they are about you. They are about signaling our
contingent next move in order to alter yours. We alter the trajectory of our interaction toward a
certain outcome, with this outcome often a negotiated settlement carrying mutual advantages.
Table 1 (Key Table) shows BECV provides a functional and externalist reframing of some
sample facial displays which BET regards as prototypical. In no case should it be interpreted as
a simple rewording of BET predictions or ratification of its expressions.
BECV is a young theory. Because its understanding of in vivo facial displays is based on a
knowledge of the interactants, their history, and their current interaction context, research
following from the BECV approach is more demanding than that required by BET, with its
prototype expressions and prescribed meanings for each. Indeed, most BET research has
been conducted using still photos [34] and written checklists, outside of fMRI tubes and within
them, consistent with a problematic trend in fields like social psychology that have seen such
‘paper-and-pencil’ responses become accepted substitutes for real-world social behavior [50].
Nonetheless, BECV has already had a major influence in two research areas: the sociality
hypothesis [51] and implicit audience effects [52].
The Sociality Hypothesis
The sociality hypothesis states that behaviors such as gestures and facial displays serve to
influence a target audience, so that the issuance of those displays should be highly dependent6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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Key Table
Table 1. Two Approaches to Sample Facial Behaviors: Expressions of Internal States versus
Functional Social Toolsa
Sample facial behavior State expressed (BET) Social use (BECV)b
Smiling Happiness Influence interactant to play or affiliate
Pouting Sadness Recruit interactant’s succor or protection
Scowling Anger Influence interactant to submit
Gasping Fear Deflect interactant’s attack via one’s own submission or incipient retreat
Nose scrunching Disgust Reject current interaction trajectory
Neutral ‘Suppressed emotion’
(poker face) or no emotion
Lead the interactant nowhere in interaction trajectory
‘Micromomentary’ or ‘compound’ expressions ‘Leaked’ or ‘blended’ emotion Conflict between displayer’s interactional tactics
aAbbreviations: BET, Basic emotions theory; BECV, behavioral ecology view of facial displays.
bPossible facial tool usage, as indicated by behavioral consequence. Display morphologies and usages in BECV are dependent on interactants, their histories, and their
social context.on the presence and positioning of that audience. The earliest evidence on the hypothesis was
provided by an observational study which found that bowlers smiled not when they made
strikes (their moments of triumph) but rather when they pivoted in their lanes to see their fellow
bowlers [53]. A succession of studies points to the same outcome: facial displays are not
‘deployed’ when BET would predict that emotion peaks, but when an audience is most
available [54–56]. In a recent study conducted with observations gathered on junior and senior
judo fighters, roughly 20% of medal match winners displayed the predicted ‘happy’ smile. Of
those judo fighters who smiled at match completion, it was engaging in social interaction with
the audience, not winning a medal match, that predicted the issuance of smiles [57]. Devel-
opmental studies have also shown that facial displays such as smiles mainly occur when an
audience is present, irrespective of the presumed emotional state of the child [58,59].
BECV does not privilege smiling among facial displays. Smiles, however, have been studied
most, for several reasons: (i) naturalistically, they are frequent and distinctive human facial
displays and thus conspicuous; (ii) methodologically, they are produced reliably in the labora-
tory, whereas other BET ‘prototype’ faces are rarely seen, given that typical facial activity is
subtle and shifting; and (iii) ethically, eliciting smiles is the least fraught.
There are notable exceptions. Expressions labeled ‘surprise’ in BET were greater among
laboratory participants with friends than those paired with strangers, or who participated
alone. The displays were captured the moment participants left the lab to find a bright green
adjacent room with furniture, rather than the stark corridor by which they had entered. The
increase in ‘surprise’ displays was unaccompanied by differing self-reports of ‘surprise’ [60].
Similar sociality effects occurred for facial displays held by BET univocally to signify happiness,
sadness, anger, and fear, following imagery inductions using BET-prototypical situations for
each. Greater facial activity, measured via electromyography, accompanied imagery of social
than solitary contexts, and these differences remained after self-reports of emotion were
controlled statistically [5].Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 7
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People make faces in many kinds of private situations (e.g., scowling at defiant pets, praying to
God, sexually self-pleasuring, and the crying out of infants when their caretakers have slipped
out of sight). And it need not be a pet or deity or missing person who is ‘in mind,’ it could be a
nonliving agent (e.g., we make faces at computers that crash precipitously, or soda machines
that defiantly will not return change) or even ourselves (e.g., we make faces as we mutter to
ourselves, sotto voce or not, on our triumphs or our failures).
Could all these ‘private’ faces be implicitly social? BET theorists argued that, ‘facial expressions
do occur when people are alone . . . and contradict the theoretical proposals of those who
view expressions solely as social signals’ [61]. But did being alone physically imply that we were
alone ‘psychologically’? Soon, studies appeared which documented variations in facial behav-
ior that depended upon the presence of observers, with audiences that were both explicit
(physically present), or with solitary participants whose audiences were merely implicit, that is,
present ‘in the heads’ of the participants via imagery instructions, or located elsewhere but
ostensibly coviewing the experimental stimuli [52,62,63]. More studies replicated such implicit
audience effects, expanding the findings to infants, beyond smiling, and to augmenting versus
decrementing effects of friends versus strangers [64–66].
So why do we make faces when we are alone? For BECV, the answer is simple: although we
may be alone physically, we are never alone psychologically. When solitary infants, or injured
adults, cry out andmake plangent cry-faces, they are broadcasting signals to recruit care. Such
broadcasts are commonplace. Among our ancestors, juveniles who did not call out would have
perished sooner or more frequently than those who did. For that reason, alarm calls are
ubiquitous among animals capable of vocalization. These and other examples lead to one
conclusion: when people are not physically near, we repopulate our world with whatever is
salient. Our cast of interactants may include fantasied humans, real non-humans, humans who
are not proximal, or any nearby objects. Regardless of our casting choices, we treat them as
social interactants, and use words and faces that suit the occasion.
Future Directions
New lines of research using diverse methods, research teams, and populations are being
developed in different areas of the cognitive sciences [26,67], but, unfortunately, the scope of
human diversity still awaits a satisfactory treatment [68]. Studying the manifold strategies
whereby we use our facial displays to shape our social interactions, and how these strategies
may differ across and within diverse cultures, is one antidote to past limitations of narrow
sampling. It also offers relief from methodological traditions and operationalizations that limit
context variation and generalization [69].
Psychophysical methods, such as reverse correlations, permit sampling of stimulus parameters
(e.g., facial movements) agnostically. Minimizing a priori assumptions suggests that we use our
facial displays in ways more flexible and diverse than presupposed by theory-driven approaches
[70,71]. Individual and cultural contexts powerfully mediate the social impact of facial displays.
Because suchpsychophysicalmethodsare theoretically agnostic, theywill be key to understand-
ing how facial displays shape social interactions. Such data-driven methods are proving to be
valuable complements to traditional approaches to facial displays; they provide individual and
aggregatedmodels of the associationsbetweenourmental representationsof facial displays and
their behavioral consequences [72]. Additionally, observational studies can account for the
proximal situational cues operating during a particular interaction, which may allow determining
the plausible sets of interaction trajectories for a given display in that context.8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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displays and persuasion [73], power and dominance [74,75], smiling in pain [76], and evolu-
tionary theories of pain [77], and responses to social media [78], as well as studies with rats [79]
and chimpanzees [80]. The early contributions of BECV were within the areas of social
psychology and nonverbal communication, as an alternative to the longstanding BET
approach. We now point to two areas in which it has made distinctive, new, interdisciplinary
contributions: primatology and AI.
The Behavioral Ecology View of Facial Displays and Primatology
BECV was based in great part on contemporary views of animal signaling, and one hope was
always to regain a common framework for understanding both non-human and human dis-
plays. Primatologists have noted limitations of the ‘emotional model,’ particularly for compara-
tive research. Both by the assumptions and linguistic conventions of the BET framework,
comparative researchers are led to presumptions about emotions and ‘expressions of emotion’
that may not generalize phyletically. Specifically, they have noted that: (i) many human facial
displays have no non-human counterparts; (ii) the overall co-operative nature of human
societies probably engendered different selection pressures on display behavior than those
non-human societies that are predominantly competitive; (iii) attributing human emotion to non-
humans limits the objective study of their displays; and (iv) the emphasis on displayers’ behavior
within BET minimizes the reciprocal influence of receivers on displayers [81]. For instance, the
function of the silent bared-teeth display in rhesus macaques, once considered clearly affinitive
and homologous with human smiling [82], turns out to depend on contextual cues (e.g., the sex
of the producer and receiver, affinitive or aggressive situations) [83]. In sum, primatologists now
endorsing BECV are using a framework that strips hypotheses about non-human displays of
unproven ties to human emotion, and allows the unconstrained study of their predictive
functions in social interaction.
The Behavioral Ecology View of Facial Displays and Artificial Intelligence
Researchers in AI and social robotics are tasked with facilitating human–computer interaction,
in part by developing methods both to understand human facial displays, and to produce
reasonable facsimiles of them in embodied computerized agents. As early as 2000, it was
recognized that the dominant approach of multivariate pattern classification (matching BET-
designated prototypic posed faces to their foreordained matching emotion labels) would be
insufficient to capture: (i) the wide range of common facial displays that escape the prototypes,
(ii) their all-important contexts of issuance, and (iii) their time-courses [84]. The field of social
robotics realized the need for an ecological approach [85].
By 2015, one influential review specifically called the challenge of BECV to the assumed linkage
between emotion and facial displays in BET a ‘fundamental question’ in how virtual humans are
designed and implemented [86]. One proposed resolution was to distend the ‘emotion’
concept to include social appraisals that lead computationally to social judgments and assess-
ments of the personal significance of events, which then produce ‘emotional responses that
[will] thereby influence external behavior’ [87]. Although this kind of reconciliation is always
welcome, the causal path from emotion to action is left unspecified. This leaves it subject to the
ready objection that, like its roots in BET, it makes emotion causal when there are no agreed-
upon inclusion and exclusion criteria for determining when ‘it’ (emotion, or a specific emotion)
begins and ends [88].
Addressing these longstanding concerns led to the development of a successful AI system for
the adaptive, context-dependent facial classification of dynamic facial displays, using opticalTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 9
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Outstanding Questions
Do findings in Western industrialized
societies generalize to small-scale,
indigenous societies? For instance,
how do implicit audiences vary among
more religious (animistic or non-ani-
mistic) versus more secular societies?
How much might regional variations in
the physical aspects of faces (e.g., in
coloration of skin and sclera, bony
architecture, muscular attachments,
adiposity) and climate (average day-
time brightness, temperatures requir-
ing facial coverings versus sun
exposure that exacerbates skin wrin-
kling) affect the form and functions of
individuals’ displays in those regions?
How much does regional genetics
account for the diversity in facial dis-
plays that was always attributed to
learned ‘display rules’?
Do the facial displays we make differ
when we issue them to humans versus
non-human or inanimate objects?
According to the sociality hypothesis,
our facial displays should show more
variation and be more sustained when
we are socially engaged with another,
whose momentary response leads to
reciprocal, dynamic adjustments to
our displays. Our displays to non-
humans should be briefer and show
less variation, given that most non-
humans have prognathic faces with
long snouts that diminish their orofacial
mobility, and show briefer bouts of
social engagement with us. Inanimate
objects should occasion even less var-
iant and sustained displays, because
there is no active interactant (excepting
computers that may demand constant
visual attention). Paradoxically, per-
haps our least variable and most sus-
tained displays may occur in
broadcasted signals, like the infant’s
plangent cry with a cry-face for a care-
taker, or the lost hiker’s plea for
rescue.
Will our increasing interaction with
embodied computerized agents like
on-screen avatars, vocal assistants
like ‘Hello, Siri’, social robots, and sex-
bots affect the kinds of facial displaysflow measurement, and hidden Markov models, conditioned on a context variable, that makes
no prior assumptions about the facial displays people use or the meanings of those displays.
This AI system was directly inspired by BECV [89].
A later BECV-inspired AI project, focused on social robotics, also recognized that the interaction
movescommonwithinaparticularsocial contextweremore important inhuman–robot interaction
than thecategorical face-emotionmatchingparamount forBET.Videosegments foranalysiswere
obtainedbyhavinghumanparticipants teacha robot thenamesofvariousobjects,while recording
the faces made by the humans when the robot made successes or failures at identification. In
contrast to most previous attempts, the ‘ground truth’ of each video sequence of facial displays,
headmovements, and gaze directions, was not established theoretically, but was defined by the
pedagogical interactionsituation.Activeappearancemodels individualized foreachparticipant
enabled the development of highly discriminant feature vectors from subsegments of each video
sequence, which were cross-validated and then tested. Accuracy of the system in recognizing
‘success’ versus ‘failure’ displays, despite considerable individual and intertrial variation, equaled
average human recognition performance [90].
As these bellwether studies indicate, AI and related technologies that are designed to mimic
humannonverbal interactionwill benefit readily from the functional, externalist approachofBECV;
an approach that does not require unnecessary, and in our opiniondiversionary, inferences about
the internal workings of our android or virtual interactants, or for that matter, ourselves.
Concluding Remarks
In sum, the BECV of facial displays provides an opportunity to advance our understanding of
social interaction and influence by providing a context-dependent and functionalist approach
that accounts for human diversity in facial behavior (see Outstanding Questions). Notwith-
standing this promise, BECV will always be a tough sell, for two reasons. The first is technical.
As we indicated earlier, BECV is more demanding experimentally. It requires the systematic and
patient mapping of facial displays across a variety of contexts using different methods and
populations, and it emphasizes naturalistic observations, whenever possible, over static stimuli
and staged laboratory inductions.
The second reason is philosophical. BECV requires shaking off a romanticized view of human
nature, intrinsic to essentialist theories, that makes the face a battleground between an interior
‘authentic self’ and an external, impression-managed ‘social self.’ The first concept we
treasure; the second we concede reluctantly, and the duality goes back at least to Greco-
Roman theater and St. Augustine [91]. Within BECV, both ‘selves’ are illusory. We are unified
organisms, and like our words, voices and gestures, our facial displays are part of our plans of
action in social commerce.
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